Issue #1338 - Part 2: Update NSS to 3.48-RTM

This commit is contained in:
wolfbeast 2020-01-02 21:06:40 +01:00 committed by Roy Tam
commit c57cac24e8
885 changed files with 1650639 additions and 59530 deletions

View file

@ -114,6 +114,17 @@ inline Result ExpectTagAndSkipValue(Reader& input, uint8_t tag) {
return ExpectTagAndGetValue(input, tag, ignoredValue);
}
// This skips IMPLICIT OPTIONAL tags that are "primitive" (not constructed),
// given the number in the class of the tag (i.e. the number in the brackets in
// `issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL`).
inline Result SkipOptionalImplicitPrimitiveTag(Reader& input,
uint8_t numberInClass) {
if (input.Peek(CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | numberInClass)) {
return ExpectTagAndSkipValue(input, CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | numberInClass);
}
return Success;
}
// Like ExpectTagAndGetValue, except the output Input will contain the
// encoded tag and length along with the value.
inline Result ExpectTagAndGetTLV(Reader& input, uint8_t tag,

View file

@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ class TrustDomain {
virtual Result CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
const CertID& certID, Time time,
Time validityBeginning,
Duration validityDuration,
/*optional*/ const Input* stapledOCSPresponse,
/*optional*/ const Input* aiaExtension) = 0;

View file

@ -252,7 +252,8 @@ PathBuildingStep::Check(Input potentialIssuerDER,
}
Duration validityDuration(notAfter, notBefore);
rv = trustDomain.CheckRevocation(subject.endEntityOrCA, certID, time,
validityDuration, stapledOCSPResponse,
notBefore, validityDuration,
stapledOCSPResponse,
subject.GetAuthorityInfoAccess());
if (rv != Success) {
// Since this is actually a problem with the current subject certificate

View file

@ -105,29 +105,24 @@ BackCert::Init()
return rv;
}
static const uint8_t CSC = der::CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | der::CONSTRUCTED;
// According to RFC 5280, all fields below this line are forbidden for
// certificate versions less than v3. However, for compatibility reasons,
// we parse v1/v2 certificates in the same way as v3 certificates. So if
// these fields appear in a v1 certificate, they will be used.
// Ignore issuerUniqueID if present.
if (tbsCertificate.Peek(CSC | 1)) {
rv = der::ExpectTagAndSkipValue(tbsCertificate, CSC | 1);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
rv = der::SkipOptionalImplicitPrimitiveTag(tbsCertificate, 1);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// Ignore subjectUniqueID if present.
if (tbsCertificate.Peek(CSC | 2)) {
rv = der::ExpectTagAndSkipValue(tbsCertificate, CSC | 2);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
rv = der::SkipOptionalImplicitPrimitiveTag(tbsCertificate, 2);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
static const uint8_t CSC = der::CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | der::CONSTRUCTED;
rv = der::OptionalExtensions(
tbsCertificate, CSC | 3,
[this](Reader& extnID, const Input& extnValue, bool critical,

View file

@ -234,14 +234,14 @@ GenerateKeyPairInner()
if (!slot) {
abort();
}
PK11RSAGenParams params;
params.keySizeInBits = 2048;
params.pe = 65537;
// Bug 1012786: PK11_GenerateKeyPair can fail if there is insufficient
// entropy to generate a random key. Attempting to add some entropy and
// retrying appears to solve this issue.
for (uint32_t retries = 0; retries < 10; retries++) {
PK11RSAGenParams params;
params.keySizeInBits = 2048;
params.pe = 3;
SECKEYPublicKey* publicKeyTemp = nullptr;
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey
privateKey(PK11_GenerateKeyPair(slot.get(), CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN,
@ -262,8 +262,9 @@ GenerateKeyPairInner()
// random keys.
// https://xkcd.com/221/
static const uint8_t RANDOM_NUMBER[] = { 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4 };
if (PK11_RandomUpdate((void*) &RANDOM_NUMBER,
sizeof(RANDOM_NUMBER)) != SECSuccess) {
if (PK11_RandomUpdate(
const_cast<void*>(reinterpret_cast<const void*>(RANDOM_NUMBER)),
sizeof(RANDOM_NUMBER)) != SECSuccess) {
break;
}
}