Telemetry: Remove stubs and related code

This commit is contained in:
adeshkp 2019-01-12 06:20:31 -05:00 committed by Roy Tam
commit aea50f182f
134 changed files with 68 additions and 3422 deletions

View file

@ -102,7 +102,6 @@
#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
#include "PSMRunnable.h"
#include "RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h"
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
#include "SharedCertVerifier.h"
#include "SharedSSLState.h"
@ -112,7 +111,6 @@
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/Mutex.h"
#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
#include "mozilla/net/DNS.h"
@ -150,11 +148,6 @@ namespace {
// do not use a nsCOMPtr to avoid static initializer/destructor
nsIThreadPool* gCertVerificationThreadPool = nullptr;
// We avoid using a mutex for the success case to avoid lock-related
// performance issues. However, we do use a lock in the error case to simplify
// the code, since performance in the error case is not important.
Mutex* gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex = nullptr;
// We add a mutex to serialize PKCS11 database operations
Mutex* gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = nullptr;
@ -173,7 +166,6 @@ Mutex* gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = nullptr;
void
InitializeSSLServerCertVerificationThreads()
{
gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex = new Mutex("SSLVerificationTelemetryMutex");
gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = new Mutex("SSLVerificationPK11Mutex");
// TODO: tuning, make parameters preferences
// XXX: instantiate nsThreadPool directly, to make this more bulletproof.
@ -207,10 +199,6 @@ void StopSSLServerCertVerificationThreads()
gCertVerificationThreadPool->Shutdown();
NS_RELEASE(gCertVerificationThreadPool);
}
if (gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex) {
delete gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex;
gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex = nullptr;
}
if (gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex) {
delete gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex;
gSSLVerificationPK11Mutex = nullptr;
@ -244,8 +232,6 @@ public:
SSLServerCertVerificationResult(nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject,
PRErrorCode errorCode,
Telemetry::ID telemetryID = Telemetry::HistogramCount,
uint32_t telemetryValue = -1,
SSLErrorMessageType errorMessageType =
PlainErrorMessage);
@ -255,8 +241,6 @@ private:
public:
const PRErrorCode mErrorCode;
const SSLErrorMessageType mErrorMessageType;
const Telemetry::ID mTelemetryID;
const uint32_t mTelemetryValue;
};
class CertErrorRunnable : public SyncRunnableBase
@ -297,63 +281,6 @@ private:
const uint32_t mProviderFlags;
};
// A probe value of 1 means "no error".
uint32_t
MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(PRErrorCode errorCode)
{
switch (errorCode)
{
case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: return 2;
case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: return 3;
case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: return 4;
case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: return 5;
case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: return 6;
case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: return 7;
case SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED: return 8;
case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN: return 9;
case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: return 10;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_CA_CERT_USED_AS_END_ENTITY: return 11;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_V1_CERT_USED_AS_CA: return 12;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE: return 13;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_CERTIFICATE: return 14;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
return 15;
case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME: return 16;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_EMPTY_ISSUER_NAME: return 17;
}
NS_WARNING("Unknown certificate error code. Does MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue "
"handle everything in DetermineCertOverrideErrors?");
return 0;
}
static uint32_t
MapCertErrorToProbeValue(PRErrorCode errorCode)
{
uint32_t probeValue;
switch (errorCode)
{
// see security/pkix/include/pkix/Result.h
#define MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP(name, value, nss_name) case nss_name: probeValue = value; break;
MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP_LIST
#undef MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP
default: return 0;
}
// Since FATAL_ERROR_FLAG is 0x800, fatal error values are much larger than
// non-fatal error values. To conserve space, we remap these so they start at
// (decimal) 90 instead of 0x800. Currently there are ~50 non-fatal errors
// mozilla::pkix might return, so saving space for 90 should be sufficient
// (similarly, there are 4 fatal errors, so saving space for 10 should also
// be sufficient).
static_assert(FATAL_ERROR_FLAG == 0x800,
"mozilla::pkix::FATAL_ERROR_FLAG is not what we were expecting");
if (probeValue & FATAL_ERROR_FLAG) {
probeValue ^= FATAL_ERROR_FLAG;
probeValue += 90;
}
return probeValue;
}
SECStatus
DetermineCertOverrideErrors(const UniqueCERTCertificate& cert,
const char* hostName,
@ -562,19 +489,6 @@ CertErrorRunnable::CheckCertOverrides()
}
if (!remaining_display_errors) {
// This can double- or triple-count one certificate with multiple
// different types of errors. Since this is telemetry and we just
// want a ballpark answer, we don't care.
if (mErrorCodeTrust != 0) {
uint32_t probeValue = MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeTrust);
}
if (mErrorCodeMismatch != 0) {
uint32_t probeValue = MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeMismatch);
}
if (mErrorCodeTime != 0) {
uint32_t probeValue = MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeTime);
}
// all errors are covered by override rules, so let's accept the cert
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] All errors covered by override rules\n",
@ -621,8 +535,6 @@ CertErrorRunnable::CheckCertOverrides()
SSLServerCertVerificationResult* result =
new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject,
errorCodeToReport,
Telemetry::HistogramCount,
-1,
OverridableCertErrorMessage);
LogInvalidCertError(mInfoObject,
@ -656,8 +568,6 @@ CreateCertErrorRunnable(CertVerifier& certVerifier,
MOZ_ASSERT(infoObject);
MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
uint32_t probeValue = MapCertErrorToProbeValue(defaultErrorCodeToReport);
uint32_t collected_errors = 0;
PRErrorCode errorCodeTrust = 0;
PRErrorCode errorCodeMismatch = 0;
@ -861,334 +771,6 @@ BlockServerCertChangeForSpdy(nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject,
return SECFailure;
}
void
AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(const char* commonName,
bool commonNameInSubjectAltNames)
{
if (!commonNameInSubjectAltNames) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: common name '%s' not in subject alt. names "
"(or the subject alt. names extension is not present)\n",
commonName));
}
}
// Returns true if and only if commonName ends with altName (minus its leading
// "*"). altName has already been checked to be of the form "*.<something>".
// commonName may be NULL.
static bool
TryMatchingWildcardSubjectAltName(const char* commonName,
const nsACString& altName)
{
return commonName &&
StringEndsWith(nsDependentCString(commonName), Substring(altName, 1));
}
// Gathers telemetry on Baseline Requirements 9.2.1 (Subject Alternative
// Names Extension) and 9.2.2 (Subject Common Name Field).
// Specifically:
// - whether or not the subject common name field is present
// - whether or not the subject alternative names extension is present
// - if there is a malformed entry in the subject alt. names extension
// - if there is an entry in the subject alt. names extension corresponding
// to the subject common name
// Telemetry is only gathered for certificates that chain to a trusted root
// in Mozilla's Root CA program.
// certList consists of a validated certificate chain. The end-entity
// certificate is first and the root (trust anchor) is last.
void
GatherBaselineRequirementsTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList)
{
CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
PR_ASSERT(!(CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)));
if (CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
return;
}
CERTCertificate* cert = endEntityNode->cert;
PR_ASSERT(cert);
if (!cert) {
return;
}
UniquePORTString commonName(CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject));
// This only applies to certificates issued by authorities in our root
// program.
CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert;
PR_ASSERT(rootCert);
if (!rootCert) {
return;
}
bool isBuiltIn = false;
Result result = IsCertBuiltInRoot(rootCert, isBuiltIn);
if (result != Success || !isBuiltIn) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: root certificate for '%s' is not a built-in root "
"(or IsCertBuiltInRoot failed)\n", commonName.get()));
return;
}
ScopedAutoSECItem altNameExtension;
SECStatus rv = CERT_FindCertExtension(cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
&altNameExtension);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: no subject alt names extension for '%s'\n",
commonName.get()));
AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(), false);
return;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
CERTGeneralName* subjectAltNames =
CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena.get(), &altNameExtension);
if (!subjectAltNames) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: could not decode subject alt names for '%s'\n",
commonName.get()));
AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(), false);
return;
}
CERTGeneralName* currentName = subjectAltNames;
bool commonNameInSubjectAltNames = false;
bool nonDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = false;
bool malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = false;
bool nonFQDNPresent = false;
do {
nsAutoCString altName;
if (currentName->type == certDNSName) {
altName.Assign(BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(
currentName->name.other.data),
currentName->name.other.len);
nsDependentCString altNameWithoutWildcard(altName, 0);
if (StringBeginsWith(altNameWithoutWildcard, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("*."))) {
altNameWithoutWildcard.Rebind(altName, 2);
commonNameInSubjectAltNames |=
TryMatchingWildcardSubjectAltName(commonName.get(), altName);
}
// net_IsValidHostName appears to return true for valid IP addresses,
// which would be invalid for a DNS name.
// Note that the net_IsValidHostName check will catch things like
// "a.*.example.com".
if (!net_IsValidHostName(altNameWithoutWildcard) ||
net_IsValidIPv4Addr(altName.get(), altName.Length()) ||
net_IsValidIPv6Addr(altName.get(), altName.Length())) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: DNSName '%s' not valid (for '%s')\n",
altName.get(), commonName.get()));
malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
}
if (!altName.Contains('.')) {
nonFQDNPresent = true;
}
} else if (currentName->type == certIPAddress) {
// According to DNS.h, this includes space for the null-terminator
char buf[net::kNetAddrMaxCStrBufSize] = { 0 };
PRNetAddr addr;
if (currentName->name.other.len == 4) {
addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
memcpy(&addr.inet.ip, currentName->name.other.data,
currentName->name.other.len);
if (PR_NetAddrToString(&addr, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1) != PR_SUCCESS) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: IPAddress (v4) not valid (for '%s')\n",
commonName.get()));
malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
} else {
altName.Assign(buf);
}
} else if (currentName->name.other.len == 16) {
addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET6;
memcpy(&addr.ipv6.ip, currentName->name.other.data,
currentName->name.other.len);
if (PR_NetAddrToString(&addr, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1) != PR_SUCCESS) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: IPAddress (v6) not valid (for '%s')\n",
commonName.get()));
malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
} else {
altName.Assign(buf);
}
} else {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: IPAddress not valid (for '%s')\n",
commonName.get()));
malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
}
} else {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: non-DNSName, non-IPAddress present for '%s'\n",
commonName.get()));
nonDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
}
if (commonName && altName.Equals(commonName.get())) {
commonNameInSubjectAltNames = true;
}
currentName = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(currentName);
} while (currentName && currentName != subjectAltNames);
AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(),
commonNameInSubjectAltNames);
}
// Gather telemetry on whether the end-entity cert for a server has the
// required TLS Server Authentication EKU, or any others
void
GatherEKUTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList)
{
CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
PR_ASSERT(!(CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)));
if (CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
return;
}
CERTCertificate* endEntityCert = endEntityNode->cert;
PR_ASSERT(endEntityCert);
if (!endEntityCert) {
return;
}
// Only log telemetry if the root CA is built-in
CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert;
PR_ASSERT(rootCert);
if (!rootCert) {
return;
}
bool isBuiltIn = false;
Result rv = IsCertBuiltInRoot(rootCert, isBuiltIn);
if (rv != Success || !isBuiltIn) {
return;
}
// Find the EKU extension, if present
bool foundEKU = false;
SECOidTag oidTag;
CERTCertExtension* ekuExtension = nullptr;
for (size_t i = 0; endEntityCert->extensions && endEntityCert->extensions[i];
i++) {
oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&endEntityCert->extensions[i]->id);
if (oidTag == SEC_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) {
foundEKU = true;
ekuExtension = endEntityCert->extensions[i];
}
}
if (!foundEKU) {
return;
}
// Parse the EKU extension
UniqueCERTOidSequence ekuSequence(
CERT_DecodeOidSequence(&ekuExtension->value));
if (!ekuSequence) {
return;
}
// Search through the available EKUs
bool foundServerAuth = false;
bool foundOther = false;
for (SECItem** oids = ekuSequence->oids; oids && *oids; oids++) {
oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(*oids);
if (oidTag == SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_SERVER_AUTH) {
foundServerAuth = true;
} else {
foundOther = true;
}
}
}
// Gathers telemetry on which CA is the root of a given cert chain.
// If the root is a built-in root, then the telemetry makes a count
// by root. Roots that are not built-in are counted in one bin.
void
GatherRootCATelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList)
{
CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
PR_ASSERT(rootNode);
if (!rootNode) {
return;
}
PR_ASSERT(!CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList));
if (CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
return;
}
CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert;
PR_ASSERT(rootCert);
if (!rootCert) {
return;
}
AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_SUCCESS_BY_CA,
rootCert);
}
// These time are appoximate, i.e., doesn't account for leap seconds, etc
const uint64_t ONE_WEEK_IN_SECONDS = (7 * (24 * 60 *60));
const uint64_t ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS = 52;
// Gathers telemetry on the certificate lifetimes we observe in the wild
void
GatherEndEntityTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList)
{
CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
MOZ_ASSERT(endEntityNode && !CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList));
if (!endEntityNode || CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList)) {
return;
}
CERTCertificate* endEntityCert = endEntityNode->cert;
PR_ASSERT(endEntityCert);
if (!endEntityCert) {
return;
}
PRTime notBefore;
PRTime notAfter;
if (CERT_GetCertTimes(endEntityCert, &notBefore, &notAfter) != SECSuccess) {
return;
}
PR_ASSERT(notAfter > notBefore);
if (notAfter <= notBefore) {
return;
}
uint64_t durationInWeeks = (notAfter - notBefore)
/ PR_USEC_PER_SEC
/ ONE_WEEK_IN_SECONDS;
if (durationInWeeks > (2 * ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS)) {
durationInWeeks = (2 * ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS) + 1;
}
}
// There are various things that we want to measure about certificate
// chains that we accept. This is a single entry point for all of them.
void
GatherSuccessfulValidationTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList)
{
GatherBaselineRequirementsTelemetry(certList);
GatherEKUTelemetry(certList);
GatherRootCATelemetry(certList);
GatherEndEntityTelemetry(certList);
}
void
GatherTelemetryForSingleSCT(const ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp& sct)
{
/* STUB */
}
void
GatherCertificateTransparencyTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList,
const CertificateTransparencyInfo& info)
{
/* STUB */
}
// Note: Takes ownership of |peerCertChain| if SECSuccess is not returned.
SECStatus
AuthCertificate(CertVerifier& certVerifier,
@ -1214,7 +796,6 @@ AuthCertificate(CertVerifier& certVerifier,
CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED;
KeySizeStatus keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked;
SHA1ModeResult sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::NeverChecked;
PinningTelemetryInfo pinningTelemetryInfo;
CertificateTransparencyInfo certificateTransparencyInfo;
int flags = 0;
@ -1233,22 +814,14 @@ AuthCertificate(CertVerifier& certVerifier,
&evOidPolicy,
&ocspStaplingStatus,
&keySizeStatus, &sha1ModeResult,
&pinningTelemetryInfo,
&certificateTransparencyInfo);
uint32_t evStatus = (rv != Success) ? 0 // 0 = Failure
: (evOidPolicy == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) ? 1 // 1 = DV
: 2; // 2 = EV
if (rv == Success) {
// Certificate verification succeeded. Delete any potential record of
// certificate error bits.
RememberCertErrorsTable::GetInstance().RememberCertHasError(infoObject,
nullptr,
SECSuccess);
GatherSuccessfulValidationTelemetry(certList);
GatherCertificateTransparencyTelemetry(certList,
certificateTransparencyInfo);
// The connection may get terminated, for example, if the server requires
// a client cert. Let's provide a minimal SSLStatus
@ -1363,11 +936,6 @@ SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Run()
if (mInfoObject->isAlreadyShutDown()) {
error = SEC_ERROR_USER_CANCELLED;
} else {
Telemetry::ID successTelemetry
= Telemetry::SSL_SUCCESFUL_CERT_VALIDATION_TIME_MOZILLAPKIX;
Telemetry::ID failureTelemetry
= Telemetry::SSL_INITIAL_FAILED_CERT_VALIDATION_TIME_MOZILLAPKIX;
// Reset the error code here so we can detect if AuthCertificate fails to
// set the error code if/when it fails.
PR_SetError(0, 0);
@ -1378,21 +946,15 @@ SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Run()
MOZ_ASSERT(mPeerCertChain || rv != SECSuccess,
"AuthCertificate() should take ownership of chain on failure");
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
uint32_t interval = (uint32_t) ((TimeStamp::Now() - mJobStartTime).ToMilliseconds());
RefPtr<SSLServerCertVerificationResult> restart(
new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject, 0,
successTelemetry, interval));
new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject, 0));
restart->Dispatch();
return NS_OK;
}
// Note: the interval is not calculated once as PR_GetError MUST be called
// before any other function call
// before any other function call
error = PR_GetError();
{
TimeStamp now = TimeStamp::Now();
MutexAutoLock telemetryMutex(*gSSLVerificationTelemetryMutex);
}
if (error != 0) {
RefPtr<CertErrorRunnable> runnable(
CreateCertErrorRunnable(*mCertVerifier, error, mInfoObject, mCert,
@ -1614,19 +1176,11 @@ AuthCertificateHook(void* arg, PRFileDesc* fd, PRBool checkSig, PRBool isServer)
SSLServerCertVerificationResult::SSLServerCertVerificationResult(
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject, PRErrorCode errorCode,
Telemetry::ID telemetryID, uint32_t telemetryValue,
SSLErrorMessageType errorMessageType)
: mInfoObject(infoObject)
, mErrorCode(errorCode)
, mErrorMessageType(errorMessageType)
, mTelemetryID(telemetryID)
, mTelemetryValue(telemetryValue)
{
// We accumulate telemetry for (only) successful validations on the main thread
// to avoid adversely affecting performance by acquiring the mutex that we use
// when accumulating the telemetry for unsuccessful validations. Unsuccessful
// validations times are accumulated elsewhere.
MOZ_ASSERT(telemetryID == Telemetry::HistogramCount || errorCode == 0);
}
void