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https://repo.dactyloidae.xyz/Dactyloidae/UXP.git
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Replace NSS with Pale Moon's
This commit is contained in:
wuggy
parent
ff1e5e48bf
commit
8c2e376f94
2870 changed files with 1762232 additions and 1374220 deletions
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@ -25,52 +25,74 @@ static const struct {
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{ ssl_hash_md5, 0, 0 },
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{ ssl_hash_sha1, 0, 0 },
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{ ssl_hash_sha224, 0 },
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{ ssl_hash_sha256, CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, 32 },
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{ ssl_hash_sha384, CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384, 48 },
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{ ssl_hash_sha512, CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512, 64 }
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{ ssl_hash_sha256, CKM_SHA256, 32 },
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{ ssl_hash_sha384, CKM_SHA384, 48 },
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{ ssl_hash_sha512, CKM_SHA512, 64 }
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};
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SECStatus
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tls13_HkdfExtract(PK11SymKey *ikm1, PK11SymKey *ikm2in, SSLHashType baseHash,
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tls13_HkdfExtract(PK11SymKey *ikm1, PK11SymKey *ikm2, SSLHashType baseHash,
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PK11SymKey **prkp)
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{
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CK_NSS_HKDFParams params;
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CK_HKDF_PARAMS params;
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SECItem paramsi;
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SECStatus rv;
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SECItem *salt;
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PK11SymKey *prk;
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static const PRUint8 zeroKeyBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
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PK11SymKey *zeroKey = NULL;
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SECItem zeroKeyItem = { siBuffer, CONST_CAST(PRUint8, zeroKeyBuf), kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hashSize };
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PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
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PK11SymKey *ikm2;
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PK11SymKey *newIkm2 = NULL;
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PK11SymKey *newIkm1 = NULL;
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SECStatus rv;
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params.bExtract = CK_TRUE;
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params.bExpand = CK_FALSE;
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params.prfHashMechanism = kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech;
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params.pInfo = NULL;
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params.ulInfoLen = 0UL;
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params.pSalt = NULL;
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params.ulSaltLen = 0UL;
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params.hSaltKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
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if (ikm1) {
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/* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): This violates the PKCS#11 key boundary
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* but is imposed on us by the present HKDF interface. */
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rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ikm1);
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if (rv != SECSuccess)
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return rv;
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salt = PK11_GetKeyData(ikm1);
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if (!salt)
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return SECFailure;
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params.pSalt = salt->data;
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params.ulSaltLen = salt->len;
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PORT_Assert(salt->len > 0);
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if (!ikm1) {
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/* PKCS #11 v3.0 has and explict NULL value, which equates to
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* a sequence of zeros equal in length to the HMAC. */
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params.ulSaltType = CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL;
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} else {
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/* Per documentation for CKM_NSS_HKDF_*:
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*
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* If the optional salt is given, it is used; otherwise, the salt is
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* set to a sequence of zeros equal in length to the HMAC output.
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*/
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params.pSalt = NULL;
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params.ulSaltLen = 0UL;
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/* PKCS #11 v3.0 can take the salt as a key handle */
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params.hSaltKey = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(ikm1);
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params.ulSaltType = CKF_HKDF_SALT_KEY;
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/* if we have both keys, make sure they are in the same slot */
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if (ikm2) {
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rv = PK11_SymKeysToSameSlot(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE,
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CKA_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE,
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ikm2, ikm1, &newIkm2, &newIkm1);
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if (rv != SECSuccess) {
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SECItem *salt;
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/* couldn't move the keys, try extracting the salt */
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rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ikm1);
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if (rv != SECSuccess)
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return rv;
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salt = PK11_GetKeyData(ikm1);
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if (!salt)
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return SECFailure;
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PORT_Assert(salt->len > 0);
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/* Set up for Salt as Data instead of Salt as key */
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params.pSalt = salt->data;
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params.ulSaltLen = salt->len;
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params.ulSaltType = CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA;
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}
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/* use the new keys */
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if (newIkm1) {
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/* we've moved the key, get the handle for the new key */
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params.hSaltKey = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(newIkm1);
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/* we don't use ikm1 after this, so don't bother setting it */
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}
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if (newIkm2) {
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/* new ikm2 key, use the new key */
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ikm2 = newIkm2;
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}
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}
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}
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paramsi.data = (unsigned char *)¶ms;
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paramsi.len = sizeof(params);
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@ -80,40 +102,34 @@ tls13_HkdfExtract(PK11SymKey *ikm1, PK11SymKey *ikm2in, SSLHashType baseHash,
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PORT_Assert(kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hash == baseHash);
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/* A zero ikm2 is a key of hash-length 0s. */
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if (!ikm2in) {
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SECItem zeroItem = {
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siBuffer,
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(unsigned char *)zeroKeyBuf,
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kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hashSize
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};
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slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
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if (!ikm2) {
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/* if we have ikm1, put the zero key in the same slot */
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slot = ikm1 ? PK11_GetSlotFromKey(ikm1) : PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, NULL);
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if (!slot) {
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return SECFailure;
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}
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zeroKey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot,
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kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech,
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PK11_OriginUnwrap,
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CKA_DERIVE, &zeroItem, NULL);
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if (!zeroKey)
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newIkm2 = PK11_ImportDataKey(slot, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
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CKA_DERIVE, &zeroKeyItem, NULL);
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if (!newIkm2) {
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return SECFailure;
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ikm2 = zeroKey;
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} else {
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ikm2 = ikm2in;
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}
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ikm2 = newIkm2;
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}
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PORT_Assert(ikm2);
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PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract: IKM1/Salt", params.pSalt, params.ulSaltLen));
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PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract: IKM2", ikm2));
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prk = PK11_Derive(ikm2, kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech,
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¶msi, kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech,
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CKA_DERIVE, kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hashSize);
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if (zeroKey)
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PK11_FreeSymKey(zeroKey);
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prk = PK11_Derive(ikm2, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, ¶msi, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE,
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CKA_DERIVE, 0);
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PK11_FreeSymKey(newIkm2);
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PK11_FreeSymKey(newIkm1);
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if (slot)
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PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
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if (!prk)
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if (!prk) {
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return SECFailure;
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}
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PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract", prk));
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*prkp = prk;
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@ -122,13 +138,14 @@ tls13_HkdfExtract(PK11SymKey *ikm1, PK11SymKey *ikm2in, SSLHashType baseHash,
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}
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SECStatus
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tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash,
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const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen,
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const char *label, unsigned int labelLen,
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CK_MECHANISM_TYPE algorithm, unsigned int keySize,
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PK11SymKey **keyp)
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tls13_HkdfExpandLabelGeneral(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE deriveMech, PK11SymKey *prk,
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SSLHashType baseHash,
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const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen,
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const char *label, unsigned int labelLen,
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CK_MECHANISM_TYPE algorithm, unsigned int keySize,
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SSLProtocolVariant variant, PK11SymKey **keyp)
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{
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CK_NSS_HKDFParams params;
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CK_HKDF_PARAMS params;
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SECItem paramsi = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
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/* Size of info array needs to be big enough to hold the maximum Prefix,
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* Label, plus HandshakeHash. If it's ever to small, the code will abort.
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@ -137,8 +154,12 @@ tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash,
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sslBuffer infoBuf = SSL_BUFFER(info);
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PK11SymKey *derived;
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SECStatus rv;
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const char *kLabelPrefix = "tls13 ";
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const unsigned int kLabelPrefixLen = strlen(kLabelPrefix);
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const char *kLabelPrefixTls = "tls13 ";
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const char *kLabelPrefixDtls = "dtls13";
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const unsigned int kLabelPrefixLen =
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(variant == ssl_variant_stream) ? strlen(kLabelPrefixTls) : strlen(kLabelPrefixDtls);
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const char *kLabelPrefix =
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(variant == ssl_variant_stream) ? kLabelPrefixTls : kLabelPrefixDtls;
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PORT_Assert(prk);
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PORT_Assert(keyp);
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@ -192,17 +213,18 @@ tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash,
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params.bExtract = CK_FALSE;
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params.bExpand = CK_TRUE;
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params.prfHashMechanism = kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech;
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params.pInfo = SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&infoBuf);
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params.ulInfoLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&infoBuf);
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paramsi.data = (unsigned char *)¶ms;
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paramsi.len = sizeof(params);
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derived = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(prk, kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech,
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derived = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(prk, deriveMech,
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¶msi, algorithm,
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CKA_DERIVE, keySize,
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CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY);
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if (!derived)
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if (!derived) {
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return SECFailure;
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}
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*keyp = derived;
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@ -225,20 +247,35 @@ tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash,
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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SECStatus
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tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash,
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const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen,
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const char *label, unsigned int labelLen,
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CK_MECHANISM_TYPE algorithm, unsigned int keySize,
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SSLProtocolVariant variant, PK11SymKey **keyp)
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{
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return tls13_HkdfExpandLabelGeneral(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, prk, baseHash,
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handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen,
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label, labelLen, algorithm, keySize,
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variant, keyp);
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}
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SECStatus
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tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash,
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const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen,
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const char *label, unsigned int labelLen,
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unsigned char *output, unsigned int outputLen)
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SSLProtocolVariant variant, unsigned char *output,
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unsigned int outputLen)
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{
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PK11SymKey *derived = NULL;
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SECItem *rawkey;
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SECStatus rv;
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rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(prk, baseHash, handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen,
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label, labelLen,
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kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech, outputLen,
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&derived);
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/* the result is not really a key, it's a data object */
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rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelGeneral(CKM_HKDF_DATA, prk, baseHash,
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handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen,
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label, labelLen, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, outputLen,
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variant, &derived);
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if (rv != SECSuccess || !derived) {
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goto abort;
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}
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