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https://repo.dactyloidae.xyz/Dactyloidae/UXP.git
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Replace NSS with Pale Moon's
This commit is contained in:
wuggy
parent
ff1e5e48bf
commit
8c2e376f94
2870 changed files with 1762232 additions and 1374220 deletions
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@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
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#include "sslimpl.h"
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#include "sslproto.h"
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#include "tls13hkdf.h"
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#include "tls13psk.h"
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#include "tls13subcerts.h"
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SECStatus
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@ -80,7 +81,15 @@ SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len)
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inf.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme;
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}
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inf.resumed = ss->statelessResume || ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming;
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if (inf.resumed) {
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inf.pskType = ssl_psk_resume;
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} else if (inf.authType == ssl_auth_psk) {
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inf.pskType = ssl_psk_external;
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} else {
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inf.pskType = ssl_psk_none;
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}
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inf.peerDelegCred = tls13_IsVerifyingWithDelegatedCredential(ss);
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inf.echAccepted = ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted;
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if (sid) {
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unsigned int sidLen;
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@ -101,6 +110,7 @@ SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len)
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sidLen = PR_MIN(sidLen, sizeof inf.sessionID);
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inf.sessionIDLength = sidLen;
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memcpy(inf.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidLen);
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inf.isFIPS = ssl_isFIPS(ss);
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}
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}
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@ -132,6 +142,7 @@ SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd,
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return SECFailure;
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}
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/* All fields MUST be zero initialized! */
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memset(&inf, 0, sizeof(inf));
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inf.length = PR_MIN(sizeof(inf), len);
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@ -144,19 +155,32 @@ SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd,
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/* We shouldn't be able to send early data if the handshake is done. */
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PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone || !inf.canSendEarlyData);
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if (ss->sec.ci.sid &&
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(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent ||
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ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted)) {
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inf.maxEarlyDataSize =
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if (ss->sec.ci.sid) {
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PRUint32 ticketMaxEarlyData =
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ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size;
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} else {
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inf.maxEarlyDataSize = 0;
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/* Resumption token info. */
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inf.ticketSupportsEarlyData = (ticketMaxEarlyData > 0);
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if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent ||
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ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) {
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if (ss->statelessResume) {
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inf.maxEarlyDataSize = ticketMaxEarlyData;
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} else if (ss->psk) {
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/* We may have cleared the handshake list, so check the socket.
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* This is permissable since we only support one EPSK at a time. */
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inf.maxEarlyDataSize = ss->psk->maxEarlyData;
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}
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}
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}
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inf.zeroRttCipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttSuite;
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inf.peerDelegCred = tls13_IsVerifyingWithDelegatedCredential(ss);
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inf.authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
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inf.signatureScheme = ss->sec.signatureScheme;
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inf.echAccepted = ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted;
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/* Only expose this if the application should use it for verification. */
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inf.echPublicName = (inf.echAccepted == PR_FALSE) ? ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName : NULL;
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memcpy(info, &inf, inf.length);
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return SECSuccess;
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@ -300,10 +324,8 @@ static const SSLCipherSuiteInfo suiteInfo[] = {
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_3DES, B_3DES, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_none },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_none },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA256, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_sha256 },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_CAMELLIA, B_128, M_SHA256, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_sha256 },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_none },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_CHACHA20, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_sha256 },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_CAMELLIA, B_256, M_SHA384, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_sha384 },
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{ 0, CS(ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDH, C_NULL, B_0, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDH_R, ssl_hash_none },
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{ 0, CS(ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDH, C_RC4, B_128, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDH_R, ssl_hash_none },
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@ -316,14 +338,12 @@ static const SSLCipherSuiteInfo suiteInfo[] = {
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_3DES, B_3DES, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA256, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha256 },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_CAMELLIA, B_128, M_SHA256, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha256 },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_CHACHA20, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha256 },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA384, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha384 },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA384, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_sha384 },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AESGCM, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_sha384 },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AESGCM, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha384 },
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{ 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_CAMELLIA, B_256, M_SHA384, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha384 },
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{ 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_AESGCM, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_sha384 },
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{ 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_AESGCM, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha384 },
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@ -419,24 +439,37 @@ tls13_Exporter(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *secret,
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return SECFailure;
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}
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SSLHashType hashAlg;
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/* Early export requires a PSK. As in 0-RTT, default
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* to the first PSK if no suite is negotiated yet. */
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if (secret == ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret && !ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) {
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if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)) {
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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hashAlg = ((sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks))->hash;
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} else {
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hashAlg = tls13_GetHash(ss);
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}
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/* Pre-hash the context. */
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rv = tls13_ComputeHash(ss, &contextHash, context, contextLen);
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rv = tls13_ComputeHash(ss, &contextHash, context, contextLen, hashAlg);
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if (rv != SECSuccess) {
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return rv;
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}
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rv = tls13_DeriveSecretNullHash(ss, secret, label, labelLen,
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&innerSecret);
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&innerSecret, hashAlg);
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if (rv != SECSuccess) {
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return rv;
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}
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rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(innerSecret,
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tls13_GetHash(ss),
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hashAlg,
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contextHash.u.raw, contextHash.len,
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kExporterInnerLabel,
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strlen(kExporterInnerLabel),
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out, outLen);
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ss->protocolVariant, out, outLen);
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PK11_FreeSymKey(innerSecret);
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return rv;
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}
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