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moebius#226: Consider blocking top level window data: URIs (part 2/2 without tests)
https://github.com/MoonchildProductions/moebius/pull/226
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commit
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16 changed files with 194 additions and 66 deletions
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@ -10,20 +10,16 @@
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#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
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#include "nsIDocument.h"
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#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
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#include "nsNullPrincipal.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h"
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NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsContentSecurityManager,
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nsIContentSecurityManager,
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nsIChannelEventSink)
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/* static */ bool
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nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
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nsIURI* aURI,
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nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType,
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nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
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bool aLoadFromExternal)
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nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(nsIChannel* aChannel)
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{
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// Let's block all toplevel document navigations to a data: URI.
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// In all cases where the toplevel document is navigated to a
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@ -36,17 +32,24 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
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if (!mozilla::net::nsIOService::BlockToplevelDataUriNavigations()) {
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return true;
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}
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if (aContentPolicyType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
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nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
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if (!loadInfo) {
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return true;
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}
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if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
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return true;
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
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nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
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bool isDataURI =
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(NS_SUCCEEDED(aURI->SchemeIs("data", &isDataURI)) && isDataURI);
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(NS_SUCCEEDED(uri->SchemeIs("data", &isDataURI)) && isDataURI);
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if (!isDataURI) {
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return true;
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}
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// Whitelist data: images as long as they are not SVGs
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nsAutoCString filePath;
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aURI->GetFilePath(filePath);
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uri->GetFilePath(filePath);
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if (StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("image/")) &&
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!StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("image/svg+xml"))) {
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return true;
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@ -56,22 +59,29 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
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StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/json"))) {
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return true;
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}
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if (!aLoadFromExternal &&
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nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)) {
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// Redirecting to a toplevel data: URI is not allowed, hence we make
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// sure the RedirectChain is empty.
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if (!loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal() &&
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nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()) &&
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loadInfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty()) {
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return true;
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}
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nsAutoCString dataSpec;
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aURI->GetSpec(dataSpec);
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uri->GetSpec(dataSpec);
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if (dataSpec.Length() > 50) {
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dataSpec.Truncate(50);
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dataSpec.AppendLiteral("...");
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsITabChild> tabChild = do_QueryInterface(loadInfo->ContextForTopLevelLoad());
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc;
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if (tabChild) {
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doc = static_cast<mozilla::dom::TabChild*>(tabChild.get())->GetDocument();
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}
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NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 specUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(dataSpec));
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const char16_t* params[] = { specUTF16.get() };
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nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
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NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("DATA_URI_BLOCKED"),
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// no doc available, log to browser console
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nullptr,
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doc,
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nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
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"BlockTopLevelDataURINavigation",
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params, ArrayLength(params));
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@ -541,27 +551,6 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* aOldChannel,
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}
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}
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// Redirecting to a toplevel data: URI is not allowed, hence we pass
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// a NullPrincipal as the TriggeringPrincipal to
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// AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI() which definitely blocks any
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// data: URI load.
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nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> newLoadInfo = aNewChannel->GetLoadInfo();
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if (newLoadInfo) {
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
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nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aNewChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> nullTriggeringPrincipal = nsNullPrincipal::Create();
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if (!nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
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uri,
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newLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType(),
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nullTriggeringPrincipal,
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false)) {
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// logging to console happens within AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI
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aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
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}
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}
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// Also verify that the redirecting server is allowed to redirect to the
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// given URI
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> oldPrincipal;
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