moebius#223: Consider blocking top level window data: URIs (part 1/3 without tests)

https://github.com/MoonchildProductions/moebius/pull/223
This commit is contained in:
janekptacijarabaci 2018-04-22 18:51:38 +02:00 committed by Roy Tam
commit 712d19e1b7
22 changed files with 515 additions and 1 deletions

View file

@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h"
#include "nsEscape.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
#include "nsIOService.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsCORSListenerProxy.h"
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsIDocument.h"
#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
#include "nsNullPrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
@ -15,6 +18,66 @@ NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsContentSecurityManager,
nsIContentSecurityManager,
nsIChannelEventSink)
/* static */ bool
nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
nsIURI* aURI,
nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType,
nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
bool aLoadFromExternal)
{
// Let's block all toplevel document navigations to a data: URI.
// In all cases where the toplevel document is navigated to a
// data: URI the triggeringPrincipal is a codeBasePrincipal, or
// a NullPrincipal. In other cases, e.g. typing a data: URL into
// the URL-Bar, the triggeringPrincipal is a SystemPrincipal;
// we don't want to block those loads. Only exception, loads coming
// from an external applicaton (e.g. Thunderbird) don't load
// using a codeBasePrincipal, but we want to block those loads.
if (!mozilla::net::nsIOService::BlockToplevelDataUriNavigations()) {
return true;
}
if (aContentPolicyType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
return true;
}
bool isDataURI =
(NS_SUCCEEDED(aURI->SchemeIs("data", &isDataURI)) && isDataURI);
if (!isDataURI) {
return true;
}
// Whitelist data: images as long as they are not SVGs
nsAutoCString filePath;
aURI->GetFilePath(filePath);
if (StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("image/")) &&
!StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("image/svg+xml"))) {
return true;
}
// Whitelist data: PDFs and JSON
if (StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/pdf")) ||
StringBeginsWith(filePath, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/json"))) {
return true;
}
if (!aLoadFromExternal &&
nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)) {
return true;
}
nsAutoCString dataSpec;
aURI->GetSpec(dataSpec);
if (dataSpec.Length() > 50) {
dataSpec.Truncate(50);
dataSpec.AppendLiteral("...");
}
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 specUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(dataSpec));
const char16_t* params[] = { specUTF16.get() };
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("DATA_URI_BLOCKED"),
// no doc available, log to browser console
nullptr,
nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
"BlockTopLevelDataURINavigation",
params, ArrayLength(params));
return false;
}
static nsresult
ValidateSecurityFlags(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
{
@ -478,6 +541,27 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* aOldChannel,
}
}
// Redirecting to a toplevel data: URI is not allowed, hence we pass
// a NullPrincipal as the TriggeringPrincipal to
// AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI() which definitely blocks any
// data: URI load.
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> newLoadInfo = aNewChannel->GetLoadInfo();
if (newLoadInfo) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aNewChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> nullTriggeringPrincipal = nsNullPrincipal::Create();
if (!nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
uri,
newLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType(),
nullTriggeringPrincipal,
false)) {
// logging to console happens within AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI
aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
}
// Also verify that the redirecting server is allowed to redirect to the
// given URI
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> oldPrincipal;