Update NSS to 3.41

This commit is contained in:
wolfbeast 2018-12-15 01:42:53 +01:00 committed by Roy Tam
commit 5f0986e66f
540 changed files with 49568 additions and 10631 deletions

View file

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#include "sslproto.h"
#include "gtest_utils.h"
#include "scoped_ptrs.h"
#include "nss_scoped_ptrs.h"
#include "tls_connect.h"
#include "tls_filter.h"
#include "tls_parser.h"
@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectGeneric, ServerNegotiateTls12) {
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
Connect();
}
#ifndef TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION
// Test the ServerRandom version hack from
// [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11 Section 6.3.1.1].
@ -56,71 +55,116 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectGeneric, ServerNegotiateTls12) {
// two validate that we can also detect fallback using the
// SSL_SetDowngradeCheckVersion() API.
TEST_F(TlsConnectTest, TestDowngradeDetectionToTls11) {
client_->SetOption(SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK, PR_TRUE);
MakeTlsFilter<TlsClientHelloVersionSetter>(client_,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1);
ConnectExpectFail();
ASSERT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, client_->error_code());
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertIllegalParameter);
client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO);
server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT);
}
/* Attempt to negotiate the bogus DTLS 1.1 version. */
// Attempt to negotiate the bogus DTLS 1.1 version.
TEST_F(DtlsConnectTest, TestDtlsVersion11) {
MakeTlsFilter<TlsClientHelloVersionSetter>(client_, ((~0x0101) & 0xffff));
ConnectExpectFail();
ConnectExpectAlert(server_, kTlsAlertHandshakeFailure);
// It's kind of surprising that SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP is
// what is returned here, but this is deliberate in ssl3_HandleAlert().
EXPECT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP, client_->error_code());
EXPECT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, server_->error_code());
client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
}
// Disabled as long as we have draft version.
TEST_F(TlsConnectTest, TestDowngradeDetectionToTls12) {
EnsureTlsSetup();
MakeTlsFilter<TlsClientHelloVersionSetter>(client_,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
client_->SetOption(SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK, PR_TRUE);
MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionDropper>(client_, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn);
client_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
server_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
ConnectExpectFail();
ASSERT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, client_->error_code());
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertIllegalParameter);
client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO);
server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT);
}
// Disabling downgrade checks will be caught when the Finished MAC check fails.
TEST_F(TlsConnectTest, TestDisableDowngradeDetection) {
client_->SetOption(SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK, PR_FALSE);
MakeTlsFilter<TlsExtensionDropper>(client_, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn);
client_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
server_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
ConnectExpectAlert(server_, kTlsAlertDecryptError);
client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT);
server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
}
// TLS 1.1 clients do not check the random values, so we should
// instead get a handshake failure alert from the server.
TEST_F(TlsConnectTest, TestDowngradeDetectionToTls10) {
// Setting the option here has no effect.
client_->SetOption(SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK, PR_TRUE);
MakeTlsFilter<TlsClientHelloVersionSetter>(client_,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0);
client_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1);
server_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
ConnectExpectFail();
ASSERT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE, server_->error_code());
ASSERT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT, client_->error_code());
ConnectExpectAlert(server_, kTlsAlertDecryptError);
server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT);
}
TEST_F(TlsConnectTest, TestFallbackFromTls12) {
EnsureTlsSetup();
client_->SetOption(SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK, PR_TRUE);
client_->SetDowngradeCheckVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
client_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1);
server_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
ConnectExpectFail();
ASSERT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, client_->error_code());
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertIllegalParameter);
client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO);
server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT);
}
static SECStatus AllowFalseStart(PRFileDesc* fd, void* arg,
PRBool* can_false_start) {
bool* false_start_attempted = reinterpret_cast<bool*>(arg);
*false_start_attempted = true;
*can_false_start = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
// If we disable the downgrade check, the sentinel is still generated, and we
// disable false start instead.
TEST_F(TlsConnectTest, DisableFalseStartOnFallback) {
// Don't call client_->EnableFalseStart(), because that sets the client up for
// success, and we want false start to fail.
client_->SetOption(SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START, PR_TRUE);
bool false_start_attempted = false;
EXPECT_EQ(SECSuccess,
SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(client_->ssl_fd(), AllowFalseStart,
&false_start_attempted));
client_->SetDowngradeCheckVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
client_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
server_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
Connect();
EXPECT_FALSE(false_start_attempted);
}
TEST_F(TlsConnectTest, TestFallbackFromTls13) {
EnsureTlsSetup();
client_->SetOption(SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK, PR_TRUE);
client_->SetDowngradeCheckVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
client_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
server_->SetVersionRange(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
ConnectExpectFail();
ASSERT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, client_->error_code());
ConnectExpectAlert(client_, kTlsAlertIllegalParameter);
client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO);
server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT);
}
#endif
TEST_P(TlsConnectGeneric, TestFallbackSCSVVersionMatch) {
client_->SetOption(SSL_ENABLE_FALLBACK_SCSV, PR_TRUE);
@ -132,6 +176,7 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectGenericPre13, TestFallbackSCSVVersionMismatch) {
server_->SetVersionRange(version_, version_ + 1);
ConnectExpectAlert(server_, kTlsAlertInappropriateFallback);
client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT);
server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT);
}
// The TLS v1.3 spec section C.4 states that 'Implementations MUST NOT send or
@ -158,7 +203,7 @@ TEST_P(TlsConnectGeneric, AlertBeforeServerHello) {
static const uint8_t kWarningAlert[] = {kTlsAlertWarning,
kTlsAlertUnrecognizedName};
DataBuffer alert;
TlsAgentTestBase::MakeRecord(variant_, kTlsAlertType,
TlsAgentTestBase::MakeRecord(variant_, ssl_ct_alert,
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, kWarningAlert,
PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kWarningAlert), &alert);
client_->adapter()->PacketReceived(alert);