Issue #2723 - Remove obsolete NPN prefs and callbacks.

NPN was removed from NSS a long time ago, this effectively does nothing.
ALPN also should be default-enabled (we do this by pref but the component
itself should have a sane default) so this was flipped as a drive-by fix.

Resolves #2723
This commit is contained in:
Moonchild 2025-06-16 20:33:16 +02:00 committed by roytam1
commit 5960178802
5 changed files with 6 additions and 51 deletions

View file

@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ pref("security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken", false);
pref("security.ssl.require_safe_negotiation", false);
pref("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling", true);
pref("security.ssl.enable_false_start", true);
pref("security.ssl.false_start.require-npn", false);
pref("security.ssl.enable_npn", true);
pref("security.ssl.enable_alpn", true);
// TLS 1.3 cipher suites

View file

@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ namespace {
// These bits are numbered so that the least subtle issues have higher values.
// This should make it easier for us to interpret the results.
const uint32_t NPN_NOT_NEGOTIATED = 64;
const uint32_t POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE = 4;
const uint32_t POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE = 2;
const uint32_t KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED = 1;
@ -1012,8 +1011,6 @@ CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, PRBool *canFalseStart)
return SECSuccess;
}
nsSSLIOLayerHelpers& helpers = infoObject->SharedState().IOLayerHelpers();
// Prevent version downgrade attacks from TLS 1.2, and avoid False Start for
// TLS 1.3 and later. See Bug 861310 for all the details as to why.
if (channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
@ -1043,23 +1040,11 @@ CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, PRBool *canFalseStart)
}
// XXX: An attacker can choose which protocols are advertised in the
// NPN extension. TODO(Bug 861311): We should restrict the ability
// ALPN extension. TODO(Bug 861311): We should restrict the ability
// of an attacker leverage this capability by restricting false start
// to the same protocol we previously saw for the server, after the
// first successful connection to the server.
// Enforce NPN to do false start if policy requires it. Do this as an
// indicator if server compatibility.
if (helpers.mFalseStartRequireNPN) {
nsAutoCString negotiatedNPN;
if (NS_FAILED(infoObject->GetNegotiatedNPN(negotiatedNPN)) ||
!negotiatedNPN.Length()) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
"NPN cannot be verified\n", fd));
reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= NPN_NOT_NEGOTIATED;
}
}
if (reasonsForNotFalseStarting == 0) {
*canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
infoObject->SetFalseStarted();

View file

@ -1440,8 +1440,7 @@ nsNSSComponent::FillTLSVersionRange(SSLVersionRange& rangeOut,
static const int32_t OCSP_ENABLED_DEFAULT = 1;
static const bool REQUIRE_SAFE_NEGOTIATION_DEFAULT = false;
static const bool FALSE_START_ENABLED_DEFAULT = true;
static const bool NPN_ENABLED_DEFAULT = true;
static const bool ALPN_ENABLED_DEFAULT = false;
static const bool ALPN_ENABLED_DEFAULT = true;
static const bool ENABLED_0RTT_DATA_DEFAULT = false;
static const bool TLS13_COMPAT_MODE_DEFAULT = false;
static const bool HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK_DEFAULT = true;
@ -1869,13 +1868,10 @@ nsNSSComponent::InitializeNSS()
Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_false_start",
FALSE_START_ENABLED_DEFAULT));
// SSL_ENABLE_NPN and SSL_ENABLE_ALPN also require calling
// SSL_SetNextProtoNego in order for the extensions to be negotiated.
// WebRTC does not do that so it will not use NPN or ALPN even when these
// preferences are true.
SSL_OptionSetDefault(SSL_ENABLE_NPN,
Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_npn",
NPN_ENABLED_DEFAULT));
// SSL_ENABLE_ALPN also requires calling SSL_SetNextProtoNego in order for
// the extensions to be negotiated.
// WebRTC does not do that so it will not use ALPN even when this preference
// is true.
SSL_OptionSetDefault(SSL_ENABLE_ALPN,
Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_alpn",
ALPN_ENABLED_DEFAULT));
@ -2066,10 +2062,6 @@ nsNSSComponent::Observe(nsISupports* aSubject, const char* aTopic,
SSL_OptionSetDefault(SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START,
Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_false_start",
FALSE_START_ENABLED_DEFAULT));
} else if (prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.ssl.enable_npn")) {
SSL_OptionSetDefault(SSL_ENABLE_NPN,
Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_npn",
NPN_ENABLED_DEFAULT));
} else if (prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.ssl.enable_alpn")) {
SSL_OptionSetDefault(SSL_ENABLE_ALPN,
Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_alpn",

View file

@ -69,13 +69,6 @@ getSiteKey(const nsACString& hostName, uint16_t port,
key.AppendInt(port);
}
// Historically, we have required that the server negotiate ALPN or NPN in
// order to false start, as a compatibility hack to work around
// implementations that just stop responding during false start. However, now
// false start is resricted to modern crypto (TLS 1.2 and AEAD cipher suites)
// so it is less likely that requring NPN or ALPN is still necessary.
static const bool FALSE_START_REQUIRE_NPN_DEFAULT = false;
} // unnamed namespace
extern LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;
@ -1260,7 +1253,6 @@ nsSSLIOLayerPoll(PRFileDesc* fd, int16_t in_flags, int16_t* out_flags)
nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::nsSSLIOLayerHelpers()
: mTreatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken(false)
, mTLSIntoleranceInfo()
, mFalseStartRequireNPN(false)
, mUnrestrictedRC4Fallback(false)
, mVersionFallbackLimit(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0)
, mutex("nsSSLIOLayerHelpers.mutex")
@ -1471,10 +1463,6 @@ PrefObserver::Observe(nsISupports* aSubject, const char* aTopic,
bool enabled;
Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken", &enabled);
mOwner->setTreatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken(enabled);
} else if (prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.ssl.false_start.require-npn")) {
mOwner->mFalseStartRequireNPN =
Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.false_start.require-npn",
FALSE_START_REQUIRE_NPN_DEFAULT);
} else if (prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.tls.version.fallback-limit")) {
mOwner->loadVersionFallbackLimit();
} else if (prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.tls.insecure_fallback_hosts")) {
@ -1516,8 +1504,6 @@ nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::~nsSSLIOLayerHelpers()
if (mPrefObserver) {
Preferences::RemoveObserver(mPrefObserver,
"security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken");
Preferences::RemoveObserver(mPrefObserver,
"security.ssl.false_start.require-npn");
Preferences::RemoveObserver(mPrefObserver,
"security.tls.version.fallback-limit");
Preferences::RemoveObserver(mPrefObserver,
@ -1576,9 +1562,6 @@ nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::Init()
Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken", &enabled);
setTreatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken(enabled);
mFalseStartRequireNPN =
Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.false_start.require-npn",
FALSE_START_REQUIRE_NPN_DEFAULT);
loadVersionFallbackLimit();
initInsecureFallbackSites();
mUnrestrictedRC4Fallback =
@ -1587,8 +1570,6 @@ nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::Init()
mPrefObserver = new PrefObserver(this);
Preferences::AddStrongObserver(mPrefObserver,
"security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken");
Preferences::AddStrongObserver(mPrefObserver,
"security.ssl.false_start.require-npn");
Preferences::AddStrongObserver(mPrefObserver,
"security.tls.version.fallback-limit");
Preferences::AddStrongObserver(mPrefObserver,

View file

@ -229,7 +229,6 @@ public:
void removeInsecureFallbackSite(const nsACString& hostname, uint16_t port);
bool isInsecureFallbackSite(const nsACString& hostname);
bool mFalseStartRequireNPN;
bool mUnrestrictedRC4Fallback;
uint16_t mVersionFallbackLimit;
private: